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The analysis begins with a brief overview of the causes
and dimensions of food insecurity in Sudan (Section 2),
in order to identify the groups most at risk of chronic
and transitory food insecurity and thus of highest
priority for targeted interventions. It continues with a
review of current food insecurity interventions, to
synthesise the strengths and weaknesses of alternative
targeting mechanisms (Section 3). It ends with a
discussion of alternative approaches to targeting,
especially in Darfur (Section 4), and with a summary
of the implications for targeting elsewhere in SSA
(Section 5).
In discussing targeting, we shall make three important
distinctions. The first is between food security
interventions (FSI) which are 'explicitly' identified in
the Government budget and 'implicit' FSI's which are
not. Explicit FSI's include food subsidies, ration
schemes or drought relief. Examples in Sudan are the
wheat subsidy, the sugar distribution and drought
relief. Implicit FSI's are the result of Government-
induced distortions in foreign exchange or cereal
markets. Examples in Sudan might be the over-valued
Sudanese Pound and Government intervention in the
market for sorghum.
The second distinction is between FSI's which are
administered and those which are self-targeted. An
administered FSI requires the establishment of
entitlement rules and the maintenance of access
registers. An example would be the sugar rationing
scheme. A self-targeted FSI relies on pricing or
commodity selection to exclude those not in need: an
example would be a subsidy on an 'inferior'
commodity consumed mostly by poor people.
Finally, we shall distinguish between targeting which
is socio-economic and that which is geographical. The
former aims to reach groups of people defined in terms
of income or asset ownership; the latter, groups
defined in terms of location. Ration schemes for poor
people would be an example of socio-economic
targeting; drought relief to everyone in affected
regions would be an example of geographical
targeting.2
2 Si ncc poor people are stil aera bIc to drought. geographical targeting
of drought prone areas has a socio-economic dimension.
1. Introduction
This paper is about the feasibility of targeting food
security interventions in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to
those who really need them. The conventional wisdom
is that targeting is the only way to limit the
unsustainable fiscal cost of generalised food and
nutrition subsidies; and that the savings brought
about by limiting access to such subsidies more than
compensate for the additional administrative costs
that targeting entails [World Bank 1986, Pinstrup-
Andersen 1988]. Our purpose is to investigate whether
the conventional wisdom holds true, not just in the
middle income countries of Asia and Latin America
from whose experience it is largely derived, but also in
the poorer and more food insecure countries of SSA.
Targeting in these countries presents special difficulties:
the proportion of the population in need is greater,
and often more widely dispersed; administrations are
much weaker; and the political constraints on
redistribution are severe.
Our case study is North Sudan, and particularly its
most westerly and food insecure region, Darfur. This
is not an easy case. Sudan is paradigmatically food
insecure, afflicted by drought, by civil war and by a
food system which is both inequitable and unstable.
Darfur mirrors those problems and adds the
difficulties of isolation and regional deprivation. The
history of targeting is not encouraging, especially of
drought relief [Keen 1988; Buchanan-Smith 1989].
Hard cases make bad law. Nevertheless, we find
grounds for optimism that targeting can be improved
in Sudan; and we believe that these lessons apply more
widely in SSA. The key is to focus not just on
safeguarding current income and food consumption,
but also on longer term livelihood interventions that
reduce vulnerability: and to do this with programmes
which are geographically specific, self-targeting in
administrative terms and designed inter alia to
support traditional community food security
arrangements. Consistency in food policy at macro
and micro levels is also important.
The authors arc all nieni hers of t he Food Seca rits lin it at the
Institute of Development Studies. University of Susses. The paper is
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2. Food Insecurity in Sudan
2.1 What is food insecurity?
The widely accepted definition of food security is:
'access by all people at all times to enough food for an
active, healthy life'. [World Bank 1986:1] Food
insecurity is the lack of access to enough food: chronic
food insecurity is defined as 'a continuously inadequate
diet caused by the inability to acquire food'; and
transitory food insecurity as 'a temporary decline in a
household's access to enough food' [ibid].
We find these definitions incomplete. As Maxwell has
suggested elsewhere, they lay insufficient emphasis on
subjective perceptions of food insecurity [Maxwell
1989:4]. In addition, we find a unidimensional
distinction between chronic and transitory food
insecurity inadequate, since it deals only with the
periodicity or incidence of food insecurity. Another
dimension has to be introduced to describe the
intensity or severity of episodes of food insecurity. A
simple classification of 'none', 'mild' and 'severe' is
used in Figure 1 to illustrate the point.
Figure 1 Model of Food Insecurity
This perspective introduces a dynamic element into
the analysis: policy makers and planners are primarily
concerned with the movement of a population from
one category describing the degree of food insecurity
to another. In Sudan, planners usually find themselves
grappling with the immediate task of preventing a
mildly food insecure population from becoming
severely food insecure, for both transitory and chronic
groups. In reality, it is very difficult to distinguish
between chronic and transitory food insecurity,
especially in periods of severe food insecurity, or
famine, when the distinction is anyway unnecessary. A
population may face conditions of 'transitory' food
insecurity with remarkable frequency - very possibly
every year in the lean period before the harvest. The
model therefore provides an analysis which is more
appropriate for practical food security planning.
2.2 Who is food insecure in Sudan and why?
There has been much debate on whether food
insecurity in Sudan is caused by exogenous factors
such as declining rainfall, drought and desertification
or whether it is caused by social, political and
ultimately economic factors [de Waal, 1989; Duffield
1990]. These two sets of causes have been combined by
Maxwell [1989] into an analysis of underlying trends
and short-term shocks.
The underlying trends include the chronic weaknesses
of the macro economy; the instability and inequity of
the food system; the commercialisation of agriculture;
the rapid urbanisation. Together, these have combined
to erode per capita income and increase income
inequality, resulting in greatly increased vulnerability
for the poorest sections of the population. Maxwell
[ibid:9] calculated that the real incomes of the poorest
groups in Sudan fell by nearly a quarter between 1965
and 1986, and estimated that 50 per cent of the total
population was at risk of food insecurity. Chronic
food insecurity affected at least a quarter of this
number.
Interacting with the long term trends and causing
severe food insecurity in recent years, have been
shorter term shocks caused by war, drought and
refugee movements from surrounding countries. The
war has been the largest and most long lasting of these
shocks, with unknown numbers killed and up to two
million displaced, many to shanty towns around
Greater Khartoum. The 1984/85 drought affected
several million people and caused tens of thousands of
deaths, at least 95,000 in Darfur alone [de Waal 1989].
Putting these factors together, Maxwell estimated that
approximately nine million people in North Sudan
suffered from chronic or transitory food insecurity in
1988. Resource-poor households in rural areas and the
urban poor formed the largest groups, concentrated in
Darfur, Khartoum and Kordofan [Maxwell 1989].
2.3 Food insecurity in Darfur
On Maxwell's analysis, nearly a quarter of all the food
insecure in North Sudan are found in Darfur, some
two million out of a total population in the region of
3.5 mn. Because Darfur is so remote from the main
concentration of commercial agriculture, it has
participated little in any processes of growth in the
centre. It is also not well integrated into the national
marketing network, and is therefore heavily dependent
on highly variable regional grain production for its
food supply. Recent outbreaks of civil disturbance in
Darfur have also created food insecurity in the conflict
areas.
Generally the most food insecure groups are resource
poor households, households in marginal agricultural
areas, and households in areas of conflict and civil
insecurity.
A rough estimate of the numbers of people affected by
food insecurity in Darfur is presented in Table I. The
largest number is found in the province of North
Darfur, where rainfall is lowest and least reliable.3
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urban rural nomad Toral
North Darfur 70(35) 900 (8!) 160 (89) 1,120 (75)
South Darfur 80 (30) 620 (44) 260 (88) 960 (48)
150 (22) 1,520 (60) 420 (89) 2080 (60)
Table I Estimated Food Insecure Population of Darfur 1989
('000 people)
Note: Figures in parentheses show food insecure populations as percentage of total population in each category.
Sources: Maxwell [1989], Swift and Gray [1989].
Many farmers on 'goz' or sandy soils in North Darfur
suffer seasonal periods of inadequate access to food.
However, the ones who are resource poor and/or farm
in the most marginal areas are more likely to be
chronically food insecure. There is a smaller number
of food insecure farmers in South Darfur, mostly
falling into the resource poor category. They may be
chronically food insecure in the same way as the
resource poor goz farmers in North Darfur. However,
poverty and vulnerability in the Southern province are
probably not as severe as in North Darfur because of
the more favourable agricultural conditions in the
south. A high percentage of pastoralists suffer from
food insecurity, especially those who have few
livestock and are resource poor. The latter may suffer
seasonal patterns of food insecurity and therefore be
transitorily food insecure. All pastoralists are
particularly vulnerable to periods of severe food
insecurity. Within all these groups, female-headed
households and households composed of old people
require specific targeting as they very often face
chronic food insecurity.
3. The Targeting of Food Security
Interventions in North Sudan
The food system in Sudan is subject to a high degree of
intervention. In this section we review the extent to
which such interventions benefit the food insecure,
particularly in Darfur. We begin with the national
picture, before turning to longer-term interventions at
the regional level and to drought relief. We end with a
review of community level responses and with a
summary of findings on targeting in Sudan.
3.1 The National Picture4
The main food security interventions as they apply to
the staple crops in Sudan are summarised in Figure 2.
Rainfall increases froni North to South. In most of North Darfur the
long-term average rainfall is below 400mm pa. In South Datfur it
ranges up to 900mm pa. The co-efficient of variation is high, up to
55 per cent in parts of North Darfur.
This account is drawn from IDS [19881. Sudan [1988] and Maxwell
[1989. 19901.
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Sorghum accounts for about three quarters of cereal
production and for about two thirds of consumption.
Ninety per cent of marketed surplus is generated by
the large-scale mechanised rainfed sector,, which is
supported by subsidised credit, a favourable exchange
rate for inputs and floor price support by the
Agricultural Bank of the Sudan. In addition, the
national strategic reserve and buffer stock are both
held in the form of sorghum. Because of its strategic
importance, sorghum is subject to controls on trade.
Wheat is a largely imported commodity, with Sudan
producing only 10 per cent of consumption and
relying on food aid for over 80 per cent of imports. The
most important food security intervention is the large
subsidy on bread, which has benefited mainly urban
areas. Millet accounts only for about 10 per cent of
production and, as the figure shows, receives no
Government support. However, it is the major food
staple in Darfur. Finally, sugar is another strategic
crop, which is distributed throughout the country on a
ration system.
The food security interventions summarised in Figure 2
are explicit in nature, which is to say that their costs
are, in principle, specified in the budget. However, in
making judgements about the total size and
consequences of these interventions, account must
also be taken of additional implicit taxes and
subsidies, caused, for example, by the distortions in
the exchange rate or controls over trade. As IDS
[l988j has shown, these are particularly important in
the case of sorghum and wheat price interventions.
Thus, the effect of the intervention in the sorghum
market by the Agricultural Bank ofSudan has been to
raise the market price, in some years, above the export
parity price which would otherwise prevail. This
effectively means that consumers are being taxed to
benefit producers. Similarly, an analysis of wheat
pricing policy using shadow exchange rates shows that
producers are being taxed to provide an additional
implicit subsidy to consumers, over and above that
explicitly accounted for [ibid].
All these interventions have been reviewed in detail
elsewhere [IDS 1988; Sudan 1988; Maxwell 1989,
Figure 2
Source: Adapted from Maxwell 1989:10
1990]. When they are considered as a complete
package, four main themes become apparent. First,
there are biases in the benefit derived from
intervention, to rich over poor, urban over rural and
core over periphery. This is evident in many ways. The
IDS food security study showed that the main
beneficiaries of the sorghum pricing policy were large-
scale mechanised farmers, numbering no more than
8,000 in total. The total cost of intervention in 1986/87
was LS 250 mn, of which two thirds was an implicit tax
on consumers, giving an average subsidy of over
LS 30,000 (approx. $US 7,000) per farm to mechanised
farmers. Mechanised rainfed farming is found mostly
in the core areas of the central plains of Sudan, which
have benefited disproportionately from Government
investment in infrastructure and agricultural research
[Brighton 19881. For example, a recent review of
agricultural research findings in the Sudan showed
that only two out of 1,300 publications on agronomy
dealt with millet [Robinson 1987].
Similarly, the wheat subsidy is in principle available to
all consumers but, in practice, is restricted to urban
areas. Within urban areas, bread is normally found
only in the centre of towns and not in marginal areas
[Duloy 1988]. The one exception to this pattern of
maldistribution of food security resources is the sugar
subsidy, which does appear to reach many rural areas,
albeit unevenly [Maxwell 1989].
Summary of food interventions
The second important conclusion about the package
of interventions is that implicit resource transfers
caused by price distortions are large compared to
explicit food subsidies. A good example is the case of
sorghum pricing quoted above, where the implicit
transfer from consumers to producers was twice as
large as the explicit cost to the Agricultural Bank of
the Sudan. A similar case is that of wheat, where
exchange rate over-valuation turns a producer subsidy
into a tax and greatly increases the level of consumer
subsidies.
A third conclusion is that Sudan does not have a good
track-record of targeting consumers using admini-
strative measures. The only national food security
intervention which registers recipients is the sugar
distribution system, but this does not discriminate
between recipients and mainly provides a method of
estimating total quantities required in different
districts. There is no experience either with self-
targeting, for example using inferior commodities,
although the proposal has been much discussed in the
context of reducing the wheat subsidy by introducing
wheat/sorghum mixes for bread making [IDS 1988;
Duloy ibid].
Finally, a fourth conclusion is that the size of these
national transfers is very large in relation to most rural
development or even emergency programmes. Thus,
in 1987/88 the explicit cost of the wheat subsidy alone
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was equivalent to 4 per cent of planned total
Government expenditure, or 7 per cent of ordinary
revenues [IDS 1988:75]. It follows that the effect of
national food security interventions may swamp those
of local interventions.
3.2 Long-term Food Security Interventions at the
Regional Level
The biases found at the national level are repeated at
the regional level, as the experience of long-term food
security interventions in Darfur demonstrates. The
1984/85 famine catalysed new programmes targeted
on the most vulnerable groups in North Darfur, but
these remain small-scale and reliant on external
funding.
The remoteness of Darfur implies that a greater level
of investment is necessary than for other regions to
sustain a comparable level of food security: most
particularly, investment in infrastructure. In practice,
the marginalisation of Darfur in national economic
policy has exacerbated food insecurity in the region
and only since the 1984/85 famine have donor
resources been plentifully available. Nevertheless, the
region is still highly undeveloped and there is still no
plan to construct a road to Khartoum, which has been
identified as the single most important intervention to
improve food security [Swift and Gray 1989].
When it comes to development projects, the two
longest standing and largest agricultural development
projects are both in the less food insecure Province of
South Darfur: Western Savannah Development
Corporation (WSDC) and Jebel Marra Rural
Development Project (JMRDP). Between them they
cover the whole Southern province. JMRDP is in one
of the areas of highest agricultural potential in the
region. While these projects make a valuable
contribution to overall production in the region,
which is indeed very important because of Darfur's
isolation from national markets, they do not
specifically target the most food insecure.
There is a question about whether it is worth targeting
North Darfur. Some believe that the development
potential is so limited, that development efforts should
be abandoned in the north in favour of the more
productive south. Declining rainfall and the threat of
environmental degradation mean that measures
should be taken to encourage the inhabitants of North
Darfur to move to South Darfur. In fact, there is
insufficient evidence to say that rainfall trends are on a
permanent decline. And enough ecological potential
does appear to exist in the north to warrant
development efforts. This potential will always be
highly variable and a development priority will
therefore be to find ways to 'drought proof' local
economies against dry years.5
For a discussion of this issuc. see Swift and (irav [1 959:36ffl.
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Since the famine, more aid has become available to
North Darfur. For example, of the 30 new projects
started in Darfur since 1986, 20 are in North Darfur.
These cover many sectors, from water and primary
health care, to agriculture and livestock, but in one
way or another most attempt to relieve food
insecurity. In 1987, a development study was carried
out in the most food insecure part of the region, in the
north east [MASDAR, 1987]. As a result, a livestock
programme with a poverty focus is being planned in
part of this area by OXFAM. In another part of North
Darfur, OXFAM is funding a successful agricultural
project targeting goz farmers, developing techniques
to increase production at the household level, with
specific programmes targeted at women. Community
level interventions are also being introduced with
village seed banks. UNICEF are funding a small
project in North Darfur designed to increase incomes
of female headed households, for example through
vegetable production and goat restocking.6
3.3 Targeting Disaster Relief
Targeting of food aid as disaster relief has been
attempted twice in Darfur in the 1980s: in 1985/86
during the famine, and again in 1988 during the
Western Relief Operation. Targeting carried out by
local Government institutions failed both times. The
consequences on both occasions were that very
inadequate amounts of grain reached the most needy.
The relief was spread too thinly to be really effective
[Keen 1988; Buchanan-Smith 1989]. The only time
targeting has been successful in Western Sudan is
when carried out by foreign NGOs: CARE in
Kordofan in 1985/86 and SCF (UK) in Darfur in 1985
[Buckley 1988]. Does this mean that targeting is only
possible when it is the responsibility of expatriate
agencies which are detached from local social and
political pressures, and have more resources for
supervision and for information collection to direct
targeting?
Two recent studies have examined the targeting of
disaster relief in Darfur: Keen [1988] has reviewed the
problems of targeting in the 1985/86 relief operations,
and Buchanan-Smith [1989] has evaluated targeting in
the Western Relief Operation. This section combines
the findings of both studies.
(a) General planning problems
The principle of targeting was clearly stated in the
relief operation plans in both 1986 and 1988, but
there was a lack of guidelines as to how targeting
was to be carried out in practice.
In 1985, the allocation plan for the relief was
misguided due to lack of information, reinforcing
For a n accou ut of si ni dar program mes in K ordofan see Shepherd
1990.
an existing urban bias at the expense of needy
rural populations.
(b) Targeting of Area Councils
Political pressure and the lobbying power of
southern Area Councils (AC) resulted in relief
allocation plans for ACs which did not
adequately reflect the greater need in North
Darfur in 1985 and again in 1988.
The most needy ACs were also often the most
remote, and transport contractors delivered to
them last: for example Geneina in 1985 and
Kutum in 1988.
(c) Targeting within Areas Councils
(y) Tn 1988, local Government officers were mostly
unaware of the objective of targeting because of
inadequate briefing and understanding of relief.
Grain was regarded as a general welfare
distribution to which everyone was entitled.
Tn 1988, the regional relief committee was
inadequately staffed and resourced to supervise
relief distributions and targeting carried out by
local Government officers within ACs.
At village level, distributions in 1985 and 1988
tended to be made according to population rather
than need. The concept of targeting external
resources appeared to run counter to social
customs, although it was sometimes argued that
existing community redistributive mechanisms
counteracted the lack of administered targeting.
Finally, a discussion of targeting disaster relief is
incomplete unless it considers recent attempts to
target displaced southern Sudanese who started to
enter Darfur in 1988 in desperate condition, fleeing the
civil war in the south. The record of regional and local
institutions has been poor.7 The relief efforts have
been initiated, funded and as far as possible run by the
international community and expatriate agencies. In
view of the intensely political nature of this kind of
targeting, it may be inevitable that foreign relief
agencies have to take responsibility.
3.4 Community-Level Interventions
As a contrast to Government sponsored food security
interventions, we turn finally to safety-nets imple-
mented by rural communities themselves. Surprisingly,
and unlike external actions, community-based safety-
nets appear to target some poor people effectively.
However, their effectiveness is declining as market
relations spread in rural areas [Duffield 1990].
The operation of community sharing mechanisms as a
survival net does not presuppose a romantic view of
P. Cutler and D. K een. personal corn nl unication.
'merrie Africa': it can and does take place in deeply
stratified communities, since the reproduction of
stratified communities depends as much on the
survival of those at the bottom of the hierarchy as of
those at the top. In the same way that individual
households go to considerable degrees of personal
hardship in order to conserve their productive
physical assets (as de Waal [1989] has demonstrated in
the case of Darfur), richer households within
communities make sacrifices to preserve their
privileged social position. In support of this,
ideologies of sharing in a crisis are widespread.
This is not inconsistent with the fact that the droughts
of the last two decades have also been the occasion ofa
rapid increase in economic and political stratification.
Some people have become very rich through these
droughts, especially those who could buy livestock at
knock-down prices from impoverished farmers or
herders, and keep them alive on pastures away from
the drought zone or on feed concentrates. Although
hard data are lacking in Darfur, it seems that few such
cases involved members of viable rural communities,
but rather urban entrepreneurs or wealthy farmers
standing outside the moral economy; this is certainly
the case, in similar circumstances, in Sahelian west
Africa and in northern Kenya for example. The
existence of such a process, as a part of the increasing
market integration of the traditional rural economies
of Darfur, is now rapidly creating conditions of
greater vulnerability and insecurity in Darfur.
When chronic food insecurity risks turning acute,
individual households and local communities pursue
well-defined strategies in the face of growing food
scarcity. Household storage of millet in pottery urns
or underground pits is almost universal in Darfur
farming societies and there is a high propensity to
store cereals: having two years household consumption
requirements in store is still seen as desirable by most
people and the technology apparently allows up to five
years' stocks to be held in usable form.
Wild foods, including a variety of fruits, berries,
leaves, roots and tubers, were and are still commonly
eaten in periods of food shortage: the fruit of mukheit
(Boscia senegalensis) is the most widespread of these,
and provides a major nutritional input in bad years in
most rural communities. The technology of its
preparation is widely known among the rural poor.
These are examples of the coping strategies of
individual households. But there are also collective
solutions to the same problem, usually called into play
when individual household solutions are no longer
viable. In effect, a widening circle of social and
eventually political relationships is called upon to
provide help to households in trouble.
Many Darfur communities share meals when food is
scarce to ensure that poor households have some food,
and the Islamic alms tax 'zakat' redistributes a fixed
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proportion of wealth from rich to poor households.
Within pastoral communities such as the Meidob
[Hales n.d.I and the Zaghawa [Tubiana 1977], animals
in milk are loaned by richer to poorer households for
the duration of their lactation, and there are a variety
of types of animal loan designed to reconstitute the
herd capital of a household below a minimum viable
level.
In some groups, collective shuna granaries, filled by
levy on individual households in good years, and
under the control of the traditional village sheikh or
higher authority, were used to meet collective
obligations of the group including the needs of
households unable to feed themselves. No shuna stores
still operate in Darfur although the physical structures
can still be seen in several places.
Migrant labour out of the community has long been a
response to poverty especially in North Darfur, and
such labour migration much increased with the
growth of mechanised farming in South Darfur and
elsewhere in Sudan. The movement of whole
households or larger groups away from areas
threatened by food insecurity and their insertion in
other livelihood systems (especially agriculture and
trade), without losing contact with the community of
origin, was characteristic of the Zaghawa response to
the droughts of the early 1970s [de Waal 1989]; such
expansion and contraction of a traditional livelihood
system along a pastoral-agricultural-urban, north-
south, axis has been well described further west among
the Twareg of central Niger [Baier 1980], and is
characteristic of risky economies like those of North
Darfur. Such mechanisms extend the principle of
community coping beyond the widening circles of
immediate households, family, close kin, clan and
ethnic/livelihood system to take in inter-community
relations across different ecological zones in cir-
cumstances where long-standing reciprocal agreements
exist.
The survival of a community's ability to act
collectively in favour of its members' food security is
closely related to the survival of the most basic
community institutions and rules of conduct, which
guide behaviour within households, clans, villages and
larger social formations. Although such institutions
and rules have clearly changed rapidly in the 20th
century, and have in some cases been formally
replaced by institutions of local and central
government, and by other principles of organisation
(the growth of market relations being especially
important), the evidence of recent anthropological
studies is that important elements survive and
continue to provide a safety net of proven efficacy.
The survival of large numbers of poor people in
Darfur through the droughts and famines of the I 970s
and 1980s is owed in part to the existence of such
mechanisms.
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3.5 Conclusion: Some propositions on targeting
in Sudan
Our review of food security interventions at the
national and local level in North Sudan demonstrates
that the range of food security interventions is very
wide, from national subsidies on wheat or sugar to
small-scale rural development projects designed to
help poor, female-headed households increase their
incomes. This complex set of planned interventions
interacts with other forces, such as the success or
failure of community support networks, the growth of
market relations, the stagnation of the macro-
economy, drought and civil war.
From the point-of-view of the food insecure in Darfur,
some food security interventions are more visible than
others. The sugar ration, emergency relief distributions
and longer-term agricultural development projects all
have high visibility. Other interventions may be
equally important to food security, through their
impact on prices, trade or employment opportunities.
The interactions of such targeted and untargeted
measures with local community self-help mechanisms
generates a complex network of food security
interventions, the effectiveness of which is hard to
measure.
However, when the package of food insecurity
interventions is considered as a whole, seven
propositions stand out:
most national food security interventions have
benefited the rich, the urban and the core, rather
than the poor, the rural and the periphery. This is
particularly true of sorghum pricing policy and
the national wheat subsidy.
again at the national level, implicit taxes and
subsidies are greater than explicit ones. Very large
changes in the size and, sometimes, the direction
of taxes and subsidies are introduced when a
shadow foreign exchange rate is used instead of
the official rate.
in isolated regions such as Darfur, the impact of
national programmes is large, probably larger
than some local programmes. In Darfur, the
negative effect of biases in Government invest-
ment in research, infrastructure and agricultural
development, combined with the price and
employment effects of sorghum market inter-
ventions, may well outweigh the positive effects
of rural development projects and emergency
relief programmes.
attempts at targeting have mostly been geo-
graphical, sometimes with benefits to the poor
(through rural projects in the west), but more
often not (the emphasis on large-scale
mechanised farming on the central plains).
(y) the closest attempt to target socio-economically
has been with relief, but the commitment to
targeting has not been strong and, combined with
inadequate planning, has mostly failed.
on the other hand, some (aid funded) project
interventions have benefited the poor, parti-
cularly those developed for the drought prone
areas of North Darfur since the famine of
1984/85. Because of the greater understanding of
local conditions possible in such a long-term
intervention, targeting the poor may be feasible in
a project framework.
finally, traditional community institutions, often
based on 'zakat', but located more generally in
the sphere of the 'moral economy', do appear still
to play a role in assuring food security. Some
social groups, for example outsiders and
newcomers, are generally excluded from these
institutions; and, in general their scope appears to
be weakening as market relations spread in rural
areas. It may be that new forms of non-
governmental organisation and action, such as,
for example, the active Sudanese Red Crescent,
represent new forms of community institution.
Project interventions and self-targeting measures
which work through such institutions may have
the best chance of success, although there are few
precedents.
These conclusions are not encouraging, but they do
suggest that there is some room to manoeuvre in
Sudan. In the next section we set out guiding principles
for the targeting of food security interventions in the
Sudan; and illustrate their application in Darfur.
4. The Way Forward
There are three main lines öfattack if targeting is to be
improved, dealing respectively with national food
policy, longer term regional rural development
programmes and short term relief. In general, we
favour eliminating implicit taxes and subsidies, which
tend not to benefit the poor; avoiding administrative
targeting, which presents insuperable management
problems; extending the scope of geographical
targeting; and extending socio-economic self-targeting
within the framework of project and programme
support for development in the most vulnerable areas.
Our proposals tend to build on local government
capability, support community level social welfare
mechanisms and help poor people to develop their
own production and asset-based family survival
strategies.8
National food policy
Three reforms would improve the targeting of
Ou r proposals d raw on OU r own experience of national and regional
food secu rit\ planning [I DS 198S: Swi ft and G rev 989; Buchanan-
Sm it h 19901. They also draw on wider literature [K ecli 1988:
Shepherd 1988: de Waal 1989, 19901.
national food security interventions. The first is the
most difficult and the most important: it is to reverse
the bias of agricultural policy to large-scale farming in
the mechanised, rainfed sector and target instead the
large mass of producers in the traditional, rainfed
sector. Because traditional farming is mostly located
in the Western regions, this requires improved
geographical targeting. The irony is that this change
would be good for growth in the long term: Evans and
Diab [1988] have shown with a multiplier analysis
using a social accounting matrix for the Sudan, that
injections based on increased output from traditional
agriculture have a greater growth impact than other
sectors. This is mainly because of high consumption
linkages in the traditional sector. Changes to the
distribution of expenditure on infrastructure, research
and extension would benefit both growth and food
security.
The second reform is to eliminate the implicit and
explicit taxes and subsidies which affect cereal
producers and consumers, particularly for sorghum
but also for wheat. As the data reported earlier
showed, ABS intervention in the sorghum market has
tended to transfer resources from (poor) consumers to
(rich) producers; the overvalued exchange rate has an
opposite (though smaller) effect in the case of wheat,
leading to a distortion of production incentives. For
sorghum, an alternative model of intervention
[Shuttleworth 1988] would lift trade restrictions and
concentrate ABS resources on defending a floor price
that was close to the export parity price. For wheat
[IDS 1988], producers would receive a price close to
the import parity price.
The third reform is to reduce the fiscal cost of the
consumer subsidy on wheat, by introducing inferior
wheat-sorghum flour to carry the subsidy and by
charging the full market price for pure wheat flour
[IDS 1988]. This would be a form of socio-economic
self-targeting that would concentrate the benefits of
the subsidy and reduce its total cost.
Long term food security at the regional level
The Darfur Food Security Plan [Swift and Gray 1989]
proposes a set of measures aimed at increasing the
long-term ability of chronically food insecure groups
to withstand threats to their food security, including
measures to increase production, improve marketing
and make markets more secure, as well as measures to
create and maintain local assets.
In the field of production, a twin track strategy is
required to reduce variability and improve productivity
in arable agriculture and extensive livestock pro-
duction, especially in North Darfur. The key to higher
agricultural output is the development of alluvial soil
farming systems, in order to reduce agricultural
pressure on ecologically marginal sandy soils. The
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measures needed include soil and water conservation,
techniques of agroforestry and a combination of new
and existing plant protection and storage technologies.
On the pastoral side, the emphasis needs to be on
restocking poor pastoral households, so that they can
re-establish viable herd sizes for independent
production.
In terms of markets, the main change needed is to
support liberalisation and integration of cereal
markets, through the abolition of restrictions on grain
movement and the construction of infrastructure,
especially roads. In addition, however, the Regional
Government should develop a small scale capacity to
hold and manage emergency grain reserve stocks.
Finally, contingency planning to enable government
to react more effectively in a crisis is also important.
The crucial ingredients of this are a stronger early
warning system, based on existing agricultural
statistics, the designation of specified 'warning levels'
based on indicators in the early warning system and a
series of interventions to prevent destitution. These
would include release of emergency stocks at
Regional, Area and Rural council levels; livestock
market interventions to encourage herders and
farmers to de-stock early in a crisis and prevent a
collapse in livestock market prices; and a public works
programme to prevent a collapse in demand for
cereals.
The main thrust of all these proposals is for greater
targeting of national resources to the region.This was
one of the key resolutions adopted by Regional
Government and donor funded project personnel at a
regional inter-projects meeting in 1988 [Darfur 1988].
As long as the civil war continues, the prospects for
this look bleak: and, as long as Government finances
are so scarce, aid will be the primary resource for
development initiatives to improve food security.
Relief Planning
The evidence shows that the targeting of relief by local
government institutions is possible but difficult, and
requires much more careful and clearer treatment in
the planning stage of the relief operation. The easiest
form of targeting is geographical, that is, differential
allocation between Area Councils according to need.
However, donor pressure is probably required to
counteract local political lobbying and good
information is critical to guide and support
recommendations for targeting. Socio-economic
targeting within communities is much more difficult
for government or outside relief agencies, but may be
feasible using local NGOs. Borton and Shoham's
review of the Sudanese Red Crescent Society's
Drought Monitoring Programme in Darfur indicates
the potential of using such a local NGO [Borton and
Shoham 1989]. This level of targeting would be
improved with better information on socio-economic
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differentiation, but information is likely to remain a
constraint for some time due to the logistical
difficulties of information collection in Sudan.
Research is also necessary to establish whether
community redistributive mechanisms do actually
work with relief, how local communities perceive
relief, and whether they integrate it into indigenous
welfare systems or not.
Relief planning must take better account of the
logistical and institutional constraints to targeting.
For example, there are frequent transport problems in
delivering to the most needy areas (which are often the
most remote). Buchanan-Smith [1989) has suggested
that a separate transport contract should be
specifically drawn up for delivering relief to those
areas alone, to avoid them being overlooked in favour
of less remote destinations. Training is required for
local government officers who are to be responsible
for relief distributions. Topics to be covered include
needs assessments and relief planning to try and come
to a common understanding between the international
community and local institutions of what relief is and
who it is for [Hubbard 1988; Buchanan-Smith 1989].
Regional relief institutions must be strengthened if
they are to be able to carry out adequate supervision of
targeting by local government officers. Otherwise the
institutional constraints must be recognised if the
relief plans are to be implementable.
5. Conclusion
We have seen that better targeting is possible in Sudan,
despite the administrative constraints. Some of the
improvements we have suggested, particularly those
involving national food policy, represent significant
redistribution and we do not underestimate the
political difficulties [Hopkins 1988]. Others, however,
may be less tendentious: we see great potential in the
smaller-scale interventions based on community or
local government activity.
The experience of Sudan is relevant to other countries
in sub-Saharan Africa. In terms of the conventional
wisdom with which we began, perhaps the most
important lesson is to try and ensure that macro and
micro food policy are consistent: it is difficult for
specific targeted programmes, however successful, to
compensate for large transfers caused by price
distortions or inappropriate market interventions.
Beyond this, a preference for geographical targeting
and self-targeting is likely to be of general relevance in
Africa. The emphasis on local government and on
developing community-based programmes is also of
relevance elsewhere, If poor people can be helped to
secure sustainable livelihoods, outside targeting may
become unnecessary.
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